Estimates of bank cost efficiency can be biased if bank heterogeneity is ignored. I compare Xinefficiency derived from a model constraining the cost frontier to be the same for all banks in the U.S. suggest it is important when studying X-inefficiency to account for differences across the markets in which banks are operating and that since X-inefficiency is, by construction, a residual, it will be particularly sensitive to omissions in the basic model.
Introduction
U.S. commercial banks have been operating in an increasingly competitive environment. The long-term viability of commercial banks in this environment depends in part on how efficiently they are run. Thus, there has been an increased interest in studies of U.S. bank efficiency and, in particular, in studies that focus on X-inefficiency. X-inefficiency comes in two varieties. A bank is technically inefficient if it is using too many inputs to produce its output. In this case, the bank would not be operating on its production frontier but would be at some point in the interior. A bank is said to be allocatively inefficient if it is using the wrong mix of inputs to produce its output. In this case, the bank may be operating on its production frontier, but it is not minimizing its production costs.
Previous studies found X-inefficiency on the order of 20 to 30 percent at U.S. banks. These numbers did not seem implausibly high, since banking is a regulated industry in which competitive forces had been restrained until recently. Yet Mester (forthcoming) found X-inefficiency in the 6 to 9 percent range at banks operating in the Third Federal Reserve District. Taking these estimates at face value 1 would suggest that Third District banks are operating more efficiently than banks elsewhere in the nation.
One possible contributing factor to the difference, however, is that Mester (forthcoming) estimated a cost model that accounted for the quality and riskiness of a bank's output. Unless such differences are controlled for, some banks might be mislabelled as inefficient because they are operating in a more riskaverse manner than others, while others might be mislabelled as efficient because they are producing lower quality output than others. Thus, the X-inefficiency measures can be expected to differ between 2 models that control for output risk and quality and those that do not. Another possible explanation for the difference is that fitting a single cost model to the U.S. is not sufficiently flexible to account for differences across markets in which the banks operate, and this could upwardly bias the inefficiency measures in previous national studies. In other words, estimates of bank cost efficiency can be biased if bank heterogeneity is not accounted for in the cost function. Other papers that have studied cost function heterogeneity include Kolari and Zardkoohi (1995) , who estimate separate cost functions for banks grouped by product mix, Akhavein, Swamy, and Taubman (forthcoming) , who estimate the banks' profit 2 function using a variable coefficient method, which essentially allows the parameters to vary by bank, and Mester (1993) , who allows mutual and stock S&L cost functions and error structures to differ.
In this paper, I compare differences in X-inefficiency measures derived from a model that constrains the cost function to be the same for all banks in the nation and a model that allows the cost functions and error terms to differ across Federal Reserve Districts. As in Mester (forthcoming), both models account for the quality and riskiness of bank output, so that differences in the X-inefficiency measures cannot be attributed to this factor. In addition to presenting the usual measure of X- These confidence intervals indicate the degree to which the mean of the conditional distribution is a good summary statistic for the level of inefficiency. The wider the distribution, the less able is the mean to characterize the distribution and so to characterize inefficiency. I also calculate approximate standard errors for the estimates of the X-inefficiency measures. These standard errors reflect the accuracy with which the parameters of the error structure are measured and allow me to test for equality of the measures across Federal Reserve Districts.
My results show that both explanations for differences in the findings of Mester (forthcoming) and for previous national studies contain some truth: Third District banks do seem to be operating more efficiently than other banks, but I also find that estimating a single cost function across the nation is insufficiently flexible. In both the single cost function model and the separate cost functions model, average inefficiency is lower in the Third District than in the other Federal Reserve Districts. But my results also show that (1) the data reject the single cost function model; (2) the X-inefficiency measures based on the single cost function model are, on average, higher and more precisely estimated than those based on the separate cost functions model; (3) the distributions of the one-sided error terms on which Xinefficiency measures are based are wider for the single cost function model than for the separate cost functions model (so while the typical measure of bank-specific inefficiency is more precisely estimated in the single cost function model, it is not as good a characterization of bank-specific inefficiency for the 3 single cost function model as it is in the separate cost functions model); (4) the ranking of the Districts by the average level of X-inefficiency differs slightly, but statistically significantly, in the two models; and (5) the differences in X-inefficiency across Districts reflect more than just differences in bank size, District geographic size, and District population.
These results suggest that it is important when doing studies of X-inefficiency to account for differences across the markets in which the banks are operating. They also illustrate a more general lesson: Since X-inefficiency is, by construction, a residual, it will be particularly sensitive to omissions in the basic model. Perhaps even more care than is usual should be taken in specifying the cost model on which the X-inefficiency measures will be based.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the stochastic econometric frontier models to be estimated. The inefficiency measures, including the confidence intervals for the bank-specific measures, are derived. Section 3 discusses the functional form of the cost function, data, and variables. Section 4 presents the empirical results, and Section 5 concludes.
The models
I use the stochastic econometric cost frontier methodology to derive measures of X-inefficiency.
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A bank is labeled as inefficient if its costs are higher than the costs predicted for an efficient bank producing the same output/input-price combination and the difference cannot be explained by statistical noise. The cost frontier is obtained by estimating a cost function with a composite error term, , which is i the sum of a two-sided error, v (which represents random fluctuations in cost) and a one-sided positive For N firms in the sample,
where C is observed cost of bank i, y is the vector of output levels for bank i, w is the vector of input
prices for bank i, q is a variable characterizing the quality of bank i's output, k is the level of financial i i capital at bank i, B is a vector of parameters, ln C(y ,w ,q ,k ;B) is the predicted log cost function of a Note that as in Mester (forthcoming) and Hughes and Mester (1993) , output quality, q , and the i level of financial capital, k , are included in the cost model, since both can affect measures of Xi inefficiency. For example, if a bank has a large proportion of nonperforming loans, it might mean the bank scrimped on the initial credit evaluation and loan monitoring. This could show up as a short-run cost savings, and the bank might be labeled as more efficient than a bank that spent resources to ensure its loans were of higher quality. Financial capital is included to account for the probability of default,
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which again can affect measures of inefficiency, and also because financial capital is an input into the production process; it can be used to fund loans as a substitute for deposits or other borrowed money.
The level of financial capital, rather than its price, is included because banks may not be using the costminimizing level of financial capital (banks might be risk-averse and there are regulatory minimum capital requirements-see Mester (forthcoming) and Hughes and Mester (1993) for further discussion).
Here, as is typical of most inefficiency studies, it is assumed that the v are normally distributed i with mean 0 and variance and the u are half-normally distributed, i.e., the u are the absolute values of 2 v i i a variable that is normally distributed with mean 0 and variance . With these distributional 2 u assumptions, the log-likelihood function of the model is (2) where N is the number of firms, = u + v , = + , , and (@) is the standard normal
cumulative distribution function. The model can be estimated using maximum likelihood techniques. 
A bank-level measure of inefficiency is usually given by the mean of the conditional distribution of u given . For the normal-half-normal stochastic model, the conditional distribution of u given is a .
The mean of this conditional distribution is the distribution characterizes the distribution and serves as a summary statistic for bank-specific inefficiency will depend on how widely spread the distribution is. The spread of the distribution can be characterized by confidence intervals for (u * ). It is important to remember, however, that these bands i i
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do not account for the fact that the parameters of the conditional distribution are estimated; they 10 describe the conditional distribution, but do not indicate how precisely E(u * ) is estimated. As we will i i see below, there will often be a tradeoff: a larger sample size might allow E(u * ) to be more precisely
estimated, but because heterogeneity is likely to increase with sample size, E(u * ) will become a poorer i i summary statistic for bank-specific inefficiency.
As shown in Mester (forthcoming), the 90 percent "confidence interval" for (u* ) is [(u * ) , 
Below, I compare X-inefficiency measures for the National Model and the District Model. The National Model restricts the cost frontier and the distribution of the error terms to be the same for all banks in the nation. That is, equation (1) is estimated including all the banks in the sample. This is comparable to models estimated in previous studies of X-inefficiency at U.S. banks.
However, the National Model might be too restrictive. If economic conditions differ across the nation, a single cost frontier might not be able to capture these differences. X-inefficiency measures based on such a model might be contaminated, since they are derived from the residuals in the estimation.
That is, the better the specification of the cost frontier model, the better the measures of X-inefficiency can be expected to be. The District Model allows the cost frontier and error distribution to differ across Federal Reserve Districts. This is equivalent to estimating equation (1) 
Functional form, data, and variables
I specify the translog functional form for the cost frontier ln C(y ,w ,q ,k ;B): The outputs and inputs used here are the same as those in Mester (forthcoming) and are based on the intermediation (also known as the asset) approach to the banking firm, which views the bank as using labor, physical capital, and funding to produce earning assets [see Sealey and Lindley (1977) ]. The three outputs included were y = real estate loans, y = commercial and industrial loans, lease financing 1 2 receivables, agricultural loans, loans to depository institutions, acceptances of other banks, loans to foreign governments, obligations of states and political subdivisions, and other loans, and y = loans to 3 individuals. Each was measured by the average of the dollar volumes reported in December 1992 and 8 December 1991. These three outputs account for nearly all of a bank's non-securities earning assets. The average volume of each of these three outputs at banks in the sample was about $43 million, $23 million, and $14 million, respectively. Thus, about 54 percent of the average bank's loan portfolio is in real estate, about 29 percent is business loans, and the rest is loans to individuals.
The inputs whose prices were used to estimate the cost frontier included labor, physical capital, and borrowed money (including deposits, federal funds, and other borrowed money) used to fund the outputs. The wage rate w was proxied by [salaries and benefits expenses in 1992/number of full-time and loans to individuals/total earning assets).
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Loan output quality, q, was proxied by the average volume of nonperforming loans in 1992.
Nonperforming loans are loans that are 30 or more days past due but still accruing interest plus loans that are not accruing interest. The volume of a bank's nonperforming loans relative to the level of bank output is inversely related to the bank's loan quality. Note that while the national macroeconomy can affect nonperforming loans, its effect is felt equally across banks. The differences in nonperforming loans across banks capture not only differences in quality across banks, but also differences in local 9 economic conditions to the extent that banks operate in local loan markets. Finally, financial capital, k, was measured as the average volume of equity capital in 1992. A summary of the data and the maximum likelihood parameter estimates of the models are available from the author. each District. This can be thought of as the inefficiency of the "average bank" in the District. Thus, there is significant variation in inefficiency across most Districts. That the average level of inefficiency is somewhat lower than that found in previous national studies might be due to the fact that here I control for output risk and quality or because I am using more recent data.
Empirical results
Of course, the averages obscure some of the variation in inefficiency across the sample, and there is actually quite a lot of variation: from 2.2 percent to 89.2 percent. In the National Model, the most efficient bank is located in the Third District; its estimated inefficiency measure, E(u * ), is 0.0224, witĥ to note is that for three of the Districts-2, 5, and 12-the degree of skewness of the ordinary least squares residual of the cost function estimation was negative. As shown by Waldman (1982) this means that the maximum likelihood estimates of the model are the ordinary least squares estimates; in other words, the one-sided component of the error term is zero. More generally, this suggests that the frontier model with normal-half-normal error term does not fit the data in these Districts. Also note that convergence was not achieved in District 1; the difficulty might be a lack of observations.
One striking thing to note is that based on the District Model, two of the Districts-3 and 4-have average inefficiency levels, measured by average E(u * ) or by E(u ), under 10 percent, while twô Another thing to note is that there is a tradeoff between the precision of the estimates E(u* ) and i i the ability of E(u * ) to serve as a summary statistic for bank-specific inefficiency. Since the sample sizê i i is larger when estimating the National Model, the parameters of the error structure are more precisely estimated, and this, in turn, means that the bank-specific measures of inefficiency, E(u * ), are morê Districts. In all cases, the correlation is quite high, but is below 90 percent, suggesting that modeling assumptions do matter in efficiency studies.
The final, and most important test, is a likelihood ratio test of the National Model against the District Model. The value of the likelihood ratio test statistic (when both Models were estimated excluding District 1 banks, since convergence was not achieved in District 1 in the District Model) is 1836.15; the number of restrictions is 380. Thus, the National Model is strongly statistically rejected by the data.
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Perhaps a better way to see the differences is by comparing Figures 1 and 2 , which give the frequency distributions of the bank-specific inefficiency measures, E(u * ), for the National and District i i Models, respectively. As can be seen, the left-hand tail (low inefficiency measures) is quite a bit thicker for the District Model.
It remains to determine what accounts for the differences in inefficiency across Districts. While a thorough investigation is beyond the scope of this paper, we can determine whether the differences are accounted for merely by differences in the sizes of banks across Districts, the geographic size of the District, and/or the population of the District. To investigate this question, I employed a two-step procedure for both the National and District Models. In step 1, I regressed the bank-specific inefficiency measures, E(u * ), from the model on a constant term, bank size (measured as the average asset size of thê i i bank in December 1991 and December 1992), the land area of the District in which the bank is located, and the population of the District. E(u * ) is between 0 and 1 for each bank, so I specified a logistiĉ i i relationship between the explanatory variables and E(u * ). Thus, I estimated
In step 2, I regressed the estimated residual from the step 1 estimation, , on a constant term and a set of where Di = 1 if the bank is in District i, and 0 otherwise. I used a likelihood ratio test to test whether the coefficients on the dummy variables equal the coefficient on the constant. If so, one could conclude 18 that the differences in the bank-specific inefficiency measures were explained by bank size, District size, and District population and that any residual differences were unrelated to the District in which the bank was located. However, for both the National and District Models, this null hypothesis can be rejected at the 0.001 level of significance. That is, there are differences in inefficiency across Districts not accounted for by differences in bank size, District size, and District population. (The value of the likelihood ratio test statistic was 325.02 for the National Model, with 11 degrees of freedom, and 80.85
for the District Model, with 7 degrees of freedom. ) In both Models, in step 1, bank size was
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insignificantly positively related to inefficiency, while District size and District population were significantly positively related to inefficiency.
Conclusions
One could argue that the differences found between the National and District Models are not that large. However, a one-to-two-percentage-point difference in the average level of inefficiency seems significant enough, and the differences between the E(u ) for the nation based on the National Model (i.e., i 16 percent), and the E(u )'s for, say, the Third and Fourth Districts based on the District Model (i.e., 7.9 i percent and 9.3 percent, respectively) seem quite large. These differences might be large enough to lead one to different conclusions about the health of the banking industry or the potential for inducing further cost efficiency via mergers, for example.
The differences found here also suggest that Mester (forthcoming) found a significantly lower level of inefficiency in her study of Third District banks compared to previous national studies both because Third District banks seem to be operating more efficiently, on average, than banks elsewhere in 14 the nation, and because she focused on a more homogeneous market, while the national studies estimated a single cost frontier across heterogeneous markets.
The general lesson here is that it would appear to make sense to test whether one's model fits well across heterogeneous markets. This is likely to be especially important in inefficiency studies using the stochastic econometric frontier methodology, because the inefficiency measures are, by design, residuals. It is also important to remember that there is often a tradeoff between the precision of the estimates of bank-specific inefficiency, E(u * ), and the value of E (u * ), as an indicator of bank-specifiĉ
inefficiency. While increasing the sample size will likely increase the precision of E(u * ), it may alsô i i make E(u * ) a poorer summary statistic for bank-specific inefficiency, since bank heterogeneity is likely i i
to increase with sample size. National Model Inefficiency Distribution (Districts 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11) Inefficiency Range District Model Inefficiency Distribution (Districts 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 11) Inefficiency Range Significantly different from zero at the 5 percent level, two-tailed test. 
